The Syrian intervention: assessing the possible international law justifications by Schmitt, Michael N.
The Syrian intervention: assessing the 
possible international law justifications 
Article 
Published Version 
Schmitt, M. N. (2013) The Syrian intervention: assessing the 
possible international law justifications. International Law 
Studies, 89 (1). pp. 744-756. ISSN 2375-2831 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/89881/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
Published version at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/ils/vol89/iss1/29/ 
Publisher: U.S. Naval War College 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Syrian Intervention:  
Assessing the Possible International 
Law Justifications 
 
 
 
Michael N. Schmitt 
 
 
89 INT’L L. STUD. 744 (2013) 
 
 
 
 
Volume 89 2013 
 
 
 
 
 International Law Studies 2013 
744 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
I 
 
 
 
 
The Syrian Intervention:  
Assessing the Possible International Law  
Justifications 
 
 
 
Michael N. Schmitt

 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
    
     he seemingly tangential nature of international law to the debate regard-
ing strikes on Syria is both remarkable and disheartening.1 With war clouds 
looming, the Administration has yet to fully present its legal justification 
for military action. Instead, President Obama has merely signaled his will-
ingness to go “forward without the approval of a United Nations Security 
Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold 
                                                                                                                      
 Stockton Professor and Chairman, International Law Department, United States 
Naval War College; Professor of Public International Law, University of Exeter. The 
views expressed in this article are those of the author in his personal capacity and do not 
necessarily represent those of the United States government. 
1. The U.S. operations would be in response to alleged, repeated use by the Assad re-
gime of chemical weapons. On the chemical attacks, see Chairman, United Kingdom Joint 
Intelligence Committee, Syria: Reporting Chemical Weapons Use, Aug. 29, 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/23509
4/Jp_115_JD_PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf. The most 
significant event occurred on August, 21, 2013. U.S. estimates are that over 1000 people 
died in that attack, whereas the British estimate is approximately 350.  Contrast The White 
House, Statement by the President on Syria, Aug. 31, 2013, http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/the-press-office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria, with Joint Intelligence Organisa-
tion, Assessment on Reported Chemical Weapons Use in Damascus, Aug. 27, 2013, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/23509
4/Jp_115_JD_PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf.  
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Assad accountable.” He explains that the most recent and severe chemical 
weapons attack on 21 August 2013 
 
. . . is an assault on human dignity. It also presents a serious danger to our 
national security. It risks making a mockery of the global prohibition on 
the use of chemical weapons. It endangers our friends and our partners 
along Syria’s borders, including Israel, Jordan, Turkey, Lebanon and Iraq. 
It could lead to escalating use of chemical weapons, or their proliferation 
to terrorist groups who would do our people harm.2  
 
Use of armed force by one State against another has two legal conse-
quences. First, military operations at the level currently contemplated with 
respect to Syria initiate an “international armed conflict” in which the jus in 
bello (international humanitarian law) governs how the ensuing hostilities 
may be conducted.3 The objectives of the attacking State are irrelevant to 
the existence of an armed conflict, which is an entirely fact-based legal sta-
tus. Similarly, although disagreement exists over whether low levels of vio-
lence qualify as armed conflict,4 there is no question that operations involv-
ing cruise missiles or other aerial strikes reach this threshold.5 In lay terms, 
the launch of military operations by the United States and its partners 
against Syria would mean those countries were “at war” as a matter of in-
ternational law. 
Second, the resort to military force by a State constitutes a “use of 
force” under the jus ad bellum. The jus ad bellum addresses the issue of when 
                                                                                                                      
2. Statement by the President, supra note 1. 
3. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for In-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 
2, 1995). 
4. See, e.g., Christopher Greenwood, Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 57 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 
2008). 
5. “Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of 
armed forces is an armed conflict [qualifies as an armed conflict] . . . . It makes no differ-
ence how long the conflict lasts or how much slaughter takes place.” COMMENTARY: GE-
NEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED 
AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 32 (Jean Pictet ed., 1952); COMMENTARY: 
GENEVA CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUND-
ED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AT SEA 28 (Jean Pictet 
ed., 1960); COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR OF AUGUST 12, 1949 23 (Jean Pictet ed., 1960); COMMENTARY:  GE-
NEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF 
WAR 20 (Jean Pictet ed., 1958). 
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States may use force as an instrument of their national policies. Its most 
fundamental norm is the prohibition found in customary law and set forth 
in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter: “All Members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner in-
consistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”6 Absent an applicable 
exception to this proscription, U.S. military operations against Syria will 
arguably violate international law.  
This inaugural contribution to the “Current Developments” section of 
International Law Studies explores the possible legal justifications for using 
armed force against Syria. The analysis draws solely on international law; 
no effort is made to examine Presidential authority to order strikes under 
U.S. law. The article concludes that there is no unassailable legal basis for 
the operations. Therefore, it is imperative that the Administration provide 
its legal justification in order to inform the ongoing debate and before or-
dering U.S. forces into harm’s way. 
 
II. POSSIBLE LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
A. Security Council Authorization   
 
The U.N. Charter contains two express exceptions to the prohibition on 
the use of force.7 Security Council authorization pursuant to Articles 39 
and 42 is the first. By those articles, the Council is authorized to “deter-
mine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression” and decide upon measures, including the use of force, neces-
sary “to maintain or restore international peace and security.” There is no 
question that a Security Council Resolution authorizing “all necessary 
means” (U.N. shorthand for “force”) to respond to Syria’s use of chemical 
weapons, or to more broadly address the humanitarian disaster in the coun-
try, would be lawful. Indeed, the Security Council has authorized forceful 
                                                                                                                      
6. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).  On its customary law nature, see Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 188–90 (June 27) 
[hereinafter Nicaragua].  
7. The U.N. Secretary General has asserted that these are the only bases for the use of 
force.  See U.N. Secretary General, Press Encounter on Syria, Sept. 3, 2013, http://www 
.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=2967. 
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humanitarian interventions on a number of occasions, most recently during 
the Libyan conflict.8    
However, every indication is that Russia and/or China would exercise 
their veto power as Permanent members of the Council to block an all 
necessary means resolution. Although it is sometimes suggested that the 
General Assembly may act when the Security Council is deadlocked and 
therefore unable to respond to a serious threat to, or breach of, interna-
tional peace and security,9 the existence of such a mechanism is legally 
questionable. More to the point, in the case at hand the United States 
would be unlikely to muster the necessary votes in the General Assembly. 
 
B. Self-Defense   
 
In the absence of Security Council authorization, the sole remaining textual 
basis for using force set forth in the Charter is self-defense pursuant to Ar-
ticle 51: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a 
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken 
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.” This trea-
ty right reflects customary law.10 States subjected to an armed attack may 
respond individually or seek the assistance of other States in collective self-
defense. In the latter case, a State may provide assistance only once the vic-
tim State has requested it.11 
Syria has not attacked the United States or any other State, nor is there 
any evidence that it intends to do so in the near future. On the contrary, 
such an action would be irrational given its internal turmoil. Thus, there is 
no basis for immediate or anticipatory self or collective defense against a 
paradigmatic armed attack. It is true that that the situation in Syria is desta-
bilizing the region, particularly with respect to refugee flows into Turkey 
and other neighboring countries. However, contagious instability does not 
rise to the level of an armed attack such that the affected States may em-
ploy force in self-defense (or seek the help of other States in collective de-
                                                                                                                      
8. S.C. Res. 1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).  See also, S.C. Res. 794 (Dec. 3, 1992); S.C. Res. 814 
(Mar. 26, 1993). 
9. See discussion in Christina Binder, Uniting for Peace Resolution (1950), MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL. 
10. Nicaragua, supra note 6, ¶ 176. 
11. Id., ¶ 199. 
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fense) to stabilize the situation. And, in any event, those States have not 
made an official request for collective defense assistance. 
The only colorable self-defense argument is that the United States may 
use force to preclude the possibility of chemical weapons falling into the 
hands of transnational terrorist groups that might use them against either 
the United States or its allies. Anticipatory self-defense is limited to situa-
tions in which an armed attack is “imminent.” The imminency criterion 
had traditionally been understood as requiring temporal proximity between 
the impending armed attack and the forceful defensive action taken to pre-
vent it. This is no longer the case. In light of the risk inherent in attacks 
involving weapons of mass destruction launched without warning,12 an in-
terpretation of self-defense that has gained favor allows a State to use force 
anticipatorily when facing an attacker who has the capability and intent to 
mount an armed attack once failure to act would deprive that State of an 
ability to defend itself.13 In other words, the potential victim State may take 
forceful action if the “window of opportunity” to mount an effective de-
fense is about to close.14  
Applied to the Syrian situation, this threshold has not been crossed. 
There is no evidence that Syria intends to transfer chemical weapons to 
transnational terrorist groups targeting the United States or other countries. 
Nor has the Assad regime lost control of the country to the point where it 
is probable that the weapons will fall into the hands of terrorist groups. 
Should the latter situation occur, military operations in Syria would be 
permissible against the weapons and the terrorist groups in anticipatory 
self-defense, but not against regime targets.  
  
                                                                                                                      
12. This risk was first highlighted in THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES 15 (Nov. 2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/. 
13. See discussion in Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to Transnational Terrorism under the 
Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT: 
EXPLORING THE FAULTLINES 157 (Michael N. Schmitt & Jelena Pejic eds., 2007). 
14. The last window of opportunity approach was first set forth in Michael N. 
Schmitt, Preemptive Strategies in International Law, 24 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 524, 534–36 (2002–2003).  The U.S. government has since adopted the 
standard.  See, e.g., Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation 
Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is a Senior Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or an 
Associated Force, Draft, 7 (Nov. 8, 2011), http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc 
/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.pdf; Eric Holder, Attorney General, Remarks 
at Northwestern University School of Law, (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov 
/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html. 
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C. Violation of the Ban on Chemical Weapon.   
 
The Administration has repeatedly suggested that it may act to ensure ac-
countability for Syria’s unlawful use of chemical weapons. For instance, 
Secretary of State Kerry has argued, “all peoples and all nations who be-
lieve in the cause of our common humanity must stand up to assure that 
there is accountability for the use of chemical weapons so that it never 
happens again.”15 The question is whether Syria’s chemical attacks have 
normative significance—is the use of chemical weapons prohibited during 
non-international armed conflicts, and, if so, does this justify the use force 
by the United States? 
Treaties promulgated as early as 1899 and 1925 banned the use of 
chemical weapons for parties thereto.16 However, these earlier treaties did 
not extend to non-international armed conflicts. The 1993 Convention on 
Chemical Weapons prohibits chemical weapons use “under any circum-
stances,”17 but Syria is not party to that instrument. During negotiations 
over the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the issue of 
whether to address chemical weapons use proved extremely contentious.18 
The final Statute, adopted in Rome in 1998, lists their use as a war crime 
during international armed conflict alone.19  
Despite these facts, any doubt as to the existence of a norm prohibiting 
the use of chemical weapons in non-international armed conflict would be 
misplaced. The adoption of an amendment at the 2010 Kampala Review 
Conference filled the void in the ICC Statute by including (for States ratify-
                                                                                                                      
15. John Kerry, Sec’y of State, Remarks on Syria (Aug. 26, 2013) http://www.state 
.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/08/213503.htm.  
16. Hague Declaration (IV, 2) Concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles 
Diffusing Asphyxiating Gases, July 29, 1899, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 998, 
187 Consol. T.S. 453; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, 
Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 94 
L.N.T.S. 65  
17. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, art I.1, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 
45. 
18. Neither the United States nor Syria is Party to the Statute.  However, the Statute is 
generally considered a reliable restatement of those acts that constitute war crimes under 
customary international law; hence, its reference in the instant context. 
19. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xiii), July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.  On the Rome Statute and chemical weapons, see Dapo Akande, Can 
the ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria? EJIL: TALK!  (Aug. 23, 2013), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-icc-prosecute-for-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/.  
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ing it) the “[employment of] asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all 
analogous liquids, materials or devices” in the category of “serious viola-
tions of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an inter-
national character.”20 Additionally, the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia has held that use of chemical weapons is unlawful 
during a non-international armed conflict.21 Most importantly, the prohibi-
tion on the use of chemical weapons has undeniably crystallized into a 
norm of customary international law applicable in all armed conflicts. The 
ICRC reached this conclusion in the Customary International Humanitarian 
Law study; its characterization has not been seriously questioned.22 And, of 
course, even in the absence of an express prohibition on the employment 
of chemical weapons, their use against the civilian population would, as 
with the use of any other weapon, amount to a war crime.23 “[W]hen com-
mitted as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any ci-
vilian population,” it would also constitute a crime against humanity.24 The 
Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons is indisputably a conspicuous and 
egregious breach of international law.  
International law, however, generally provides no mechanism by which 
individual States may “punish” other States for violating international 
norms, including the prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. To some 
extent, that is a good thing because it limits the opportunity for subterfuge 
when claiming a right to use force and precludes destabilizing international 
vigilantism. Instead, States may only respond to an unlawful act with un-
friendly but lawful measures (retorsion),25 countermeasures not involving 
the use of force when they are the victim of the violation,26 and self-
                                                                                                                      
20. Amendment to Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(e)(xiv), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf. 
21. See Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 120–22, 124. 
22. I INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, r.74 and accompanying commentary (Jean-Marie Hencka-
erts & Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) [hereinafter Customary IHL]. See also MICHAEL 
N. SCHMITT, CHARLES H.B. GARRAWAY & YORAM DINSTEIN, THE MANUAL ON THE 
LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT WITH COMMENTARY ¶ 2.2.2.c (2006); 
Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion, supra note 3, ¶¶ 120–22, 124. 
23. Rome Statute, supra note 19, arts. 8(2)(c)(i) & 8(2)(e). 
24. Id., art. 7(1). 
25. See discussion in Thomas Giegerich, Retorsion, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001), http://opil.ouplaw.com/home/EPIL. 
26. International Law Commission, Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83 annex, arts. 22, 49–54, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 
12, 2001). 
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defense when the violation of international law qualifies as an armed attack. 
Beyond these circumstances, only the Security Council wields the power to 
punish States for misconduct. By the terms of Article 39 of the Charter, the 
Council may do so whenever necessary to “maintain or restore internation-
al peace and security.” In the Syrian case, robust remedies for the unlawful 
use of chemical weapons are therefore limited to Security Council action 
and to prosecution of those individuals who committed, or are otherwise 
responsible for, the war crimes and crimes against humanity.27 A U.S. at-
tack on Syria designed to hold that State accountable for its breach of in-
ternational law would itself constitute an armed attack to which Syria (and 
other States engaging in collective self-defense at Syria’s request) could re-
spond forcefully.  
 
D. Assistance to the Syrian Rebels 
 
It is well accepted that during a non-international armed conflict, external 
States may lawfully provide military assistance to the government, although 
not to rebel forces.28 But might strikes against the Assad regime be justified 
on the basis that the rebel forces have become the government of Syria? 
This is precisely the situation that prevailed once the international commu-
nity recognized Karzai’s government as the lawful Afghan government fol-
lowing the ouster of the Taliban.29 
In November 2012, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary 
and Opposition Forces (Syrian Opposition Council, SOC) was established. 
A number of States soon recognized the entity as the “legitimate repre-
sentative” of the Syrian people.30 The same month, a State Department 
spokesperson also labeled the SOC as the “legitimate representative of the 
Syrian people,” a characterization repeated in December at the Friends of 
                                                                                                                      
27. In that Syria is not Party to the Rome Statute, prosecution before that court 
would require referral by the Security Council. Rome Statute, supra note 19, ¶ 13(b).  How-
ever, the offenses are subject to universal jurisdiction, thereby affording all States the right 
under international law to prosecute the offenders. 
28. Nicaragua, supra note 6, ¶ 246. 
29. S.C. Res. 1419 (June 26, 2002). 
30. Agreement on the Formation of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary 
and Opposition Forces, Nov. 11, 2012.  On recognition as the legitimate representative, 
see, e.g., E.U. Council Conclusions on Syria, 16392/12, ¶ 2, Nov. 19, 2012, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st16/st16392.en12.pdf. 
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the Syrian People meeting.31 However, in its 2012 Digest of U.S. Practice in 
International Law, the State Department explained that despite these pro-
nouncements “the United States does not recognize the SOC as the gov-
ernment of Syria.”32 Having taken this stance, the Administration has 
closed the door to the possibility of styling military operations against As-
sad’s forces as lawful assistance to the new government of Syria. On the 
contrary, and as recognized by the American Law Institute’s Restatement (3d) 
of Foreign Relations, U.S. military support to a “rebellious regime . . . may vio-
late Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter as a use or threat of force 
against the political independence of the other state.”33 
 
E. Humanitarian Intervention 
 
In the attendant circumstances, the sole viable legal basis for attacking Syria 
is humanitarian intervention.34 The death toll since the conflict began two 
years ago now exceeds 100,000. Although the threshold at which the doc-
trine of humanitarian intervention applies is imprecise, it would seem ap-
parent that once deaths begin to be measured in the hundreds of thou-
sands, the line has been crossed. In this respect, the use of chemical weap-
ons is a bit of a red herring since the number of deaths attributable to them 
represents a fraction of the total. Therefore, at least in the humanitarian 
intervention context, Syria’s possession of, and demonstrated willingness to 
use, chemical weapons bears primarily on the issue of the likely extent of 
future deaths. 
A legal right of humanitarian intervention is not widely accepted. In-
stead, States generally tend to cite a “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P).35 By 
                                                                                                                      
31. Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State Deputy Spokesperson David Toner 
(Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/11/200477.htm#SYRIA; 
Office of the Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 281 (CarrieLyn D. Guymon ed., 2012), http://www.state.gov/docu 
ments/organization/211955.pdf. 
32. Id. 
33. Restatement of the Law Third: The Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 
203 (1987). 
34. On the subject, see Dapo Akande, The Legality of Military Action in Syria: Humanitar-
ian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect, EJIL: TALK!  (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www. 
ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-intervention-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-legality-of-
military-action-in-syria/. 
35. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Dec. 2001),  http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS 
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R2P, States are said to bear the responsibility to protect their own nationals 
from harm. When they fail to do so, other States have a commensurate re-
sponsibility to take necessary measures to protect those individuals. It must 
be emphasized that R2P is a political mechanism and moral imperative, not 
a legal obligation or right. In other words, the concept provides no inde-
pendent legal basis for using force to intervene in another State; to the ex-
tent the responsibility involves the use of force, that force may only be au-
thorized through the Security Council.36 R2P is an approach that the Unit-
ed States supports.37  
By contrast, humanitarian intervention is a legal concept, albeit one that 
does not appear in any treaty. If the doctrine exists at all, it does so only as 
a matter of customary international law. States have been reticent to openly 
embrace the doctrine for fear that other States will misuse it in order to 
interfere in the affairs of their neighbors. 
Despite such concerns, it can be fairly argued that the right has crystal-
lized into customary law over the past decades. Key way points along the 
path of this development include international condemnation for failure to 
intervene in Rwanda,38 apparent acceptance of ECOWAS interventions in 
Africa without Security Council authorization,39 the NATO intervention in 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over Kosovo, and criticism over the 
failure of the international community to intervene in a meaningful way in 
Darfur.40 Such an argument is, of course, tenuous in light of apparent op-
                                                                                                                      
%20Report.pdf. See also Gareth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 99. 
36. Report of the Secretary General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive 
Response, ¶¶ 138–39, UN Doc. A/66/874–S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012). 
37. As set forth in the Outcome Document of the 2005 U.N. World Summit, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/60/1, at ¶¶ 138–40; DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 
570. See also United States Mission to the United Nations, Remarks by the United States at 
an Informal Discussion on “Responsibility while Protecting”, Feb. 21, 2012, http://usun 
.state.gov/briefing/statements/184487.htm. 
38. See, e.g., Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations 
during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Dec. 15, 1999, annexed to Letter Dated 15 Decem-
ber 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257 (Dec. 16, 1999). 
39. U.N. Doc. S/22133 (Jan. 22, 1991); S.C. Res. 866 (Sept. 22, 1993); U.N. Doc. 
S/6481 (Feb. 26, 1998); S.C. Res. 1260 (Aug. 20, 1999). 
40. The U.N. Security Council approved deployment of a peace force (United Na-
tions Mission in Darfur—UNAMID) in 2007, but only following the signing of the Dar-
fur Peace Agreement.  S.C. Res. 1769 (July 31, 2007). 
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position to the doctrine by key States such as Russia and China; but it is 
not unreasonable.41 
To date, the United States has not expressly acknowledged a right of 
humanitarian intervention. Indeed, in the case of Syria, the Administration 
appears to be talking around the issue. This approach stands in distinction 
to that adopted by our closest ally. The United Kingdom’s government un-
der Prime Minister David Cameron has officially embraced the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention as providing a legal ground for operations 
against Syria.42 Its position can only be based on a legal conclusion that suf-
ficient State practice and opinio juris has now accumulated for a customary 
norm permitting humanitarian intervention to have fully matured.43 
The U.K. has not only accepted the legal doctrine, but has articulated 
three conditions precedent for taking action on that basis:  
 
(i) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international 
community as a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, 
requiring immediate and urgent relief; 
 
(ii) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to 
the use of force if lives are to be saved; and 
 
(iii) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to 
the aim of relief of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time 
and scope to this aim (i.e. the minimum necessary to achieve that end and 
for no other purpose).44 
 
It would be difficult to legally justify any humanitarian intervention not 
meeting these criteria. Arguably, a fourth criterion also applies. There must 
be some prospect of success, that is, the intervention must be likely to sig-
nificantly alleviate the suffering to a degree not possible through non-
                                                                                                                      
41. Only the United Kingdom and Belgium asserted the right of humanitarian inter-
vention in the Legality of the Use of Force cases before the International Court of Justice over 
the Kosovo intervention. Documents on the cases are available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3. 
42. UK Prime Minister, Chemical Weapon Use by Syrian Regime: UK Government 
Legal Position, Aug. 29, 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-
weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position/chemical-weapon-use-by-
syrian-regime-uk-government-legal-position-html-version. 
43. North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG/Den.; FRG/Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 77 (Feb. 
20). 
44. UK Government Legal Position, supra note 42. 
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forceful measures. This is a particularly relevant point in the Syrian context 
because President Obama has indicated that there will be no “boots on the 
ground” and Congress is discussing time limitations on the operations. If 
the conditions and restrictions ultimately imposed are so stringent that the 
success of the operation is drawn into question, the operation cannot quali-
fy as a lawful humanitarian intervention. 
Fulfillment of these criteria in the Syria case is a question of fact about 
which reasonable people may differ. However, the conclusion by Prime 
Minister Cameron’s government that they have been met is judicious. The 
United States could adopt a similar legal rationale for its pending strikes 
against Syria.  
 
III. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
Absent a significant change in circumstances, there is only one possible 
legal basis upon which to justify military operations against Syria—
humanitarian intervention.45 Yet, the very existence of such a right in inter-
national law is highly controversial. Moreover, the United States has never 
explicitly accepted the doctrine de jure, despite invoking it de facto as an ex-
ceptional measure during the 1999 Kosovo intervention.  
This places the United States on the horns of a dilemma. On the one 
hand, any avowed right of humanitarian intervention will represent key 
opinio juris that will measurably strengthen arguments that a third legal 
ground for using force exists in customary law. The United States should 
be concerned that other States might then take advantage of the doctrine 
for purposes that run contrary to its national interests. On the other hand, 
as a nation committed to the rule of law, the United States should only en-
gage in operations consistent with international law. When legal ambiguity 
exists, as it does in this case, the Administration must transparently set 
forth its interpretation of the law justifying the use of force against other 
States.  
In this regard, and although the U.K. Parliament rejected participation 
in strikes against Syria, the British government must be commended for 
                                                                                                                      
45. For an excellent summary of the issues discussed in this article, see Kenneth An-
derson, Legality of Intervention in Syria in Response to Chemical Weapon Attacks 17 ASIL IN-
SIGHTS (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.asil.org/insights130830.cfm. On the related subject 
of the legality of providing arms to the Syrian rebels, see Legitimacy Versus Legality Redux: 
Arming the Syrian Rebels, 7 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY __ (forth-
coming 2013). 
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taking a principled stance that its operations have to be consistent with in-
ternational law, and then setting forth a reasoned interpretation of the law 
upon which those operations could have been based. The United States 
would be well served to follow suit before ordering its armed forces into 
action. 
 
 
 
